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UNION ORGANIZING ACTIVITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Union organizing via National Labor Relations Board certification elections dropped 
sharply in 2006 to 1,648 elections, down from 2,142 in 2005 (Bureau of National Affairs 2007).  
This is one of the steepest drops in a decline dating to the early 1980s, when unions participated 
in over 6,000 elections annually (Chaison & Dhavale 1990).  The drop for 2006 may reflect 
unique circumstances, including an election year in which unions devoted substantial efforts to 
wresting control of Congress from Republicans, coupled with union efforts to pass the Employee 
Free Choice Act (EFCA).  Nevertheless, it underscores the long-term downtrend in organizing. 
 When Congress created the NLRB in 1935, elections were intended to be the primary 
means by which private sector workers could decide on union representation.  The rules changed 
in 1947 with the Taft-Hartley amendments, and to lesser degrees with other legislation and case 
law rulings.  The social and economic environment certainly changed since 1935, and the parties 
themselves evolved.  “Things are different now” is, however, not a satisfactory explanation for 
dramatic changes in election activity over the past 30 years that are underscored in the 2005-06 
decline.  Explanations are especially needed in that union leaders, notably AFL-CIO President 
John Sweeney, have publicly championed intentions to boost organizing for more than 10 years. 
 In 1995 John Sweeney rose to power in a virtually unprecedented coup.  A key plank in 
Sweeney’s platform was radically increased union organizing.  Despite efforts to realize that goal 
and considerable rhetoric, many palace guards began grumbling in the early 2000s.  Union 
decline in absolute terms, and certainly relative to job growth, continued.  The Carpenters left the 
federation, followed by a broader revolt in 2005-06 wherein several major affiliates broke away 
to join the Carpenters in a new “Change to Win” federation.   
 Assessments of Sweeney’s record and the subsequent federation break-up stress the 
limited power of the AFL-CIO vis-à-vis national union affiliates.  Decision-making authority and 
resources remain largely in the realm of national union autonomy (Chaison 2007; Fiorito & 
Jarley 2003; Hurd 2007).  Sweeney’s efforts to boost affiliates’ organizing efforts have been 
likened to “herding cats.”  Although various factors including personality clashes and priorities 
on politics and organizing played a role in the federation’s rebellion, fundamentally the rebels’ 
frustrations centered on the inability of the federation to foster change in affiliates.  
 Bronfenbrenner (2001) argued that union leaders know what must be done to boost 
membership growth, but lack the determination or ability to do it (also see Bronfenbrenner and 
Hickey 2004).  Even within the new federation, national union autonomy remains jealously 
guarded, a factor, among others, leading to questions on whether the split really matters (e.g., 
Chaison 2007). 
 Simplistic assessments and the popular media tend to focus on personality clashes, the 
irony of mentor-protégé friction, and the potential drama of dueling federations.  Fuller 
understanding also requires attention to the role of national unions, their decision processes, 
structures, environments, and other less dramatic elements.  Some assessments have recognized 
this (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 2001, Chaison 2007, Hurd 2007), but analyses still rely heavily on 
impressionistic, indirect, and anecdotal evidence.  More systematic analysis of national union 
organizing records may shed light on the nature and causes of continuing union decline. 
 Unfortunately, there is no reliable official census of union membership by union.  Official 
figures make clear that aggregate U.S. membership has steadily fallen, or at best stagnated for 
brief periods while employment has grown (U.S. Department of Labor 2007).   Private sector 
unionization fell below 8% in 2005, and further in 2006.  Even with relatively stable public 
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sector unionization at about 36%, overall density fell to 12% in 2006, roughly one-third of its 
peak level circa 1955. 
 Beyond a bleak aggregate picture, however, it is hard to know the reasons behind what 
has happened.  Unions’ own reports on their respective membership levels are often suspiciously 
inconsistent across sources and time, negotiated for some purposes (per capita tax payments to 
the federation), may or may not include certain categories of members such as retirees and 
associate members, and may or may not count members gained through mergers as new 
members.  Related data on union organizing activity are scattered across at least three federal and 
numerous state agencies.  These sources record votes, but not membership.  It is unclear how 
much organizing unions are undertaking outside of “official channels” (e.g., NLRB).  Self-
reports from the federation’s now-defunct Work in Progress publication reported only union 
gains, and did so inconsistently.  They do suggest, however, that organizing via elections still 
represents a large share, roughly 85%, of total union organizing activity.   
 This paper systematically examines national union data from the last years of the 
“Kirkland Era” (1990-1995) and the first several years of the “Sweeney Era” (1999-2004) – 
allowing that an interim period, 1996-98, reflects a transition phase.  After a data-driven review 
that establishes “the facts” as best we can, our attention turns to prior analyses that attempt to 
illuminate inter-union differences.  A concluding section draws tentative inferences on prospects 
for union revitalization and union policies, and suggests lines of further research. 
 
A Partial Organizing Record for National Unions 
 Table 1 shows indicators of membership, membership growth, NLRB organizing win 
rates, NLRB jurisdiction elections and relative organizing effort, and leader views on organizing 
effectiveness, commitment, and expenditures during 1990-2004 for national unions with 50,000 
or more members as of 2004.  Other than the NLRB-based data, these measures are based on 
self-reports.  Self-reports may be self-serving, as suggested by an average assessment of 
organizing effectiveness of 3.6 on a 5-point scale for 1990 and 2.5 on a 4-point scale for 1997 for 
all national unions (see Table 2 below) and somewhat higher respective values (3.8 and 2.9) for 
the large unions shown in Table 1.  Self-reports may also have some advantages over objective 
data in netting out environmental influences such as employer resistance and employment 
changes underlying more objective data.  Prior studies found that self-reports on organizing 
effectiveness correlated with more objective indicators in ways supporting their validity (e.g., 
Fiorito, Jarley, & Delaney 1995). 
-- Please see Table 1 -- 
 Table 1’s membership data reveal a wide range of union experience from 1990-2004.  
The figures show impressive growth for the SEIU, IAFF, IATSE, and PTE, and abysmal decline 
for the ANA, RWDSU, TCU, and AFM as well as for some better-known unions including the 
UMW and UAW.  These “bottom line” figures reflect many influences, including mergers, 
absorptions, “automatic” growth and decline through union security clauses and bargaining unit 
expansions/contractions, as well as the effects of organizing and decertification.  The USWA, for 
example, appears mildly successful in membership growth over this era (+17.7%), but this 
reflects mergers that brought workers from rubber manufacturing and other industries into the 
USWA while steel membership fell.  Thus membership growth can reflect organizing success, 
but it is by no means a clear indicator.  Varying growth rates between the Kirkland and Sweeney 
eras for specific unions may reflect timing of particular mergers, differing environmental 
conditions, or changes in organizing strategies, tactics, and results.  Unions on average increased 
their membership by 3.1% over the 1990-2004 period as shown in Table 2, but declined during 
the Kirkland era by 5.3% and increased membership during the Sweeney era by 2.7%.  
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Consolidation, rather than organizing, however, is the principal explanation for this “growth” as 
overall union membership declined from 16.7 million in 1990 to 15.5 million in 2004 (Hirsch & 
Macpherson 2007), while average national union size increased from 142.6 thousand members to 
172.9 thousand as shown in Table 2.   
-- Please see Table 2-- 
 The NLRB win rate figures in Table 1 are more precisely about organizing success, but 
are limited to NLRB jurisdiction elections actually held.  They do not reflect non-NLRB 
jurisdiction organizing, card check “elections,” or possible differing propensities to pursue 
campaigns to elections depending on authorization card signings.  Some unions may proceed to 
elections only when large proportions of workers have signed cards, and win a high proportion, 
and others may proceed to riskier elections and achieve lower win rates.  Thus win rates may 
connote strategies as well as effectiveness. 
 Caveats noted, there are clearly NLRB win rate differences between unions and over 
time.  The SEIU nears the top of the list in both eras and improved its win rate noticeably over 
time, from 64.6% to 72.4%.  The IBT shows one of the lower win rates in both eras, and 
improved its rate less than most unions, from 43.3% to 45.2%.  The average win rate across all 
unions for the Kirkland era was 51% as compared to 61% for the Sweeney era, as shown for 
unions with 10 or more NLRB elections in an era (see Table 2).  Tradeoffs between NLRB 
organizing activity levels and win rates are apparent in the SEIU vs. IBT comparison, and for 
unions generally in the correlation between activity level indicators and win rates for the 
Kirkland era (r = -0.43, p < .01), but less clearly for the Sweeney era (r = 0.06, NS), as shown in 
Table 3.   
--Please see Table 3-- 
 Correlations among the various organizing success and activity indicators in Table 3 
underscore that each type of measure conveys somewhat different information.  In neither the 
Kirkland nor Sweeney era is there strong evidence of consistency between self-assessed 
organizing effectiveness and membership growth.  The Kirkland era correlation is 0.08 (NS) and 
the Sweeney era correlation is .02 (NS).  Similarly, NLRB win rates are at best marginally 
correlated with self-assessed organizing effectiveness in both periods (Kirkland era r = .21, p < 
.10 one-tailed, and Sweeney era r = .13, NS).  Self-assessed organizing effectiveness does not 
correlate with NRLB organizing activity level in either era (NS correlations of –0.03 and –0.06, 
respectively). 
 Although the NLRB win rate and membership growth rate improvements between the 
Kirkland and Sweeney eras shown in Table 2 might be cited in support of Sweeney’s success in 
refocusing unions on organizing, organizing activity is arguably more relevant, and for it the 
evidence is mixed.  The number of NLRB certification elections rose briefly during Sweeney’s 
early years, then seemingly returned to a long-term downtrend.  This is reflected in data for 
specific unions in Table 1, and in summary form by the drop in the average number of elections 
per union in Table 2, which shows that the mean dropped from about 260 elections in the 
Kirkland Era to about 139 elections in the Sweeney Era.  These figures overstate the decline 
because the latter period includes data for more small unions that lower the average, but even a 
same-unions comparison shows that the average union participated in about 59 fewer elections in 
the latter period (see Table 4).  Comparing numbers of elections across very different unions, 
however, is of limited value.  Organizing requires resources and unions vary greatly in size and 
resources.   
-- Please see Table 4 -- 
 Consequently, emphasis here is on relative organizing activity, that is, numbers of 
workers “tried” (workers whose representation rights were sought) per thousand members for the 
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union seeking their representation rights via the NLRB.  Relative organizing activity rose from 
an average of 62.4 eligible voters tried per thousand members to 73.4, but is virtually unchanged 
on a same-unions basis (see Table 4).  For several seemingly “organizing-active” unions such as 
the IBT, UFCW, USWA, and LIUNA, relative organizing activity fell.  Organizing budgets 
averaged only about 14.5% of total union spending (for a relatively small number of reporting 
unions, N=44) in contrast to Sweeney’s 30% goal, and showed a mild upward trend over three 
years, 1996-98 (Fiorito, Jarley, & Delaney 2007).  Here too there is considerable variation across 
unions, consistent with distinctions drawn between “organizing,” “organizing-driven,” or 
“organizing-active” unions (or similar terms) and other unions (e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Hickey 
2004).  As Table 2 shows, relative variability in organizing activity is far greater than that in win 
rates.  The coefficient of variation (CV) for NLRB elections is in the 600-900% vicinity, and 
even after adjusting for union size and taking into account size of units targeted for organizing, 
relative organizing activity’s CV ranges from 85% (Kirkland Era) to 194% (Sweeney Era), but 
for win rates the CV range is only from 24% (Kirkland Era) to 28%.   
 Other organizing activity or commitment indicators from Tables 1-4, namely the 
organizing budget share estimate and self-reported commitment to organizing, correlate with 
each other (r = .58, p < .01), but not consistently with NLRB organizing activity.  This may 
reflect the former two measures’ common source in the 1997 survey, but also the 1997 point-in-
time perspective of these items versus the specific time periods for the NLRB organizing activity 
indicator (either 1990-95 or 1999-2004).  In particular, genuine change in organizing 
commitment that occurred in the Sweeney Era or late in the preceding transition period (1996-
98) would not be reflected in the 1997 survey.  This is an important point in that the NLRB 
organizing activity measure clearly shows changes for some unions, although often the change is 
a dramatic drop.  On average, although win rates improved by five to six percentage points on a 
same-unions basis, relative organizing activity did not change significantly on that basis, as 
shown in Table 4.  Finally from Table 4, the organizing self-rating on a same-unions basis 
dropped significantly. 
 As revealed by some of the evidence already noted there is some intra-union consistency 
over time, i.e., evidence of stable types in the correlation evidence.  Although there is little 
consistency over time in membership growth (r=.12, NS), this indicator is contaminated by 
mergers, absorptions, and such.  Win rates (r=.58, p<.01 ) and relative organizing effort (r=.53,  
p<.01), as well as self-rated organizing effectiveness (r=.41, p<.01) tend to suggest that there is 
some consistency over time.  There has been some shuffling of the ranks.  Some nationals’ 
NLRB win rates changed by 10 percentage points or more, for example (see Table 1).  Some 
unions’ growth rates changed dramatically.  Relative organizing effort increased and decreased 
by +/- 30 percent for some nationals. 
 Are unions organizing (more) yet?  That is, despite all the noise in the signals, can we say 
that organizing is increasing?  The answer seems to be “no,” at least at the aggregate level.  At 
that level, the organizing surge has been more rhetoric than reality.  Is this a rational union 
responses to hostile environments, a failure to exploit opportunities, or some of both?  
Regrettably, there have been limited analyses of between-union differences as yet.  Such 
analyses are needed to address “Why?”  Examining the experience of specific national unions 
might be illuminating. 
 Obviously there are many indicators one might consider, and unfortunately they 
sometimes diverge and some may involve tradeoffs that complicate interpretation.  NLRB win 
rates and relative organizing effort measures represent conceptually and practically important 
indicators in a potential tradeoff relation.  A union might be able to organize more extensively, 
but with lower success.  Conversely, it may scale back its efforts but improve its success rate, 
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i.e., focus its efforts more intensively.  If a union increased both its organizing effort and its win 
rate, that would seem unambiguously positive, and in contrast, if its effort and win rate both fell, 
that would seem decidedly negative.  Chart 1 lays out this point in graphical terms.  Quadrant 1 
(top right) shows increased both organizing efforts and win rates.  Quadrant 2 (lower right) 
shows increased win rates, but decreased organizing efforts.  Quadrant 3 (lower left) shows 
decreases in both, and Quadrant 4 (upper left) depicts decreased win rates but increased 
organizing efforts. 
-- Please see Chart 1 --- 
Figure 1 applies the scheme of Chart 1 and plots changes in relative organizing effort and 
win rates for the 11 largest U.S. union, those with 500,000 or more members in 2004.  Most of 
these “giants” improved both their relative organizing effort and their win rates between the 
Kirkland and Sweeney eras.  Only one had decreases in both, three improved win rates while 
diminishing organizing effort, and none expanded efforts with reduced success.  The tradeoff 
referenced earlier is not evident in Figure 2; rather, win rates and effort improved together, on 
average.  This positive relation weakens in a more inclusive figure for all unions with 50,000 or 
more members (see Figure 2) and does not hold in a similar plot for “all” unions (all those with 
non-missing data; see Figure 3), but even among all unions, a plurality of unions fall in the first 
quadrant, coupling increased efforts and improved success. 
-- Please see Figures 1-3--- 
 These plots put a rather different light on changes in organizing efforts.  Although the 
aggregate figures show improved win rates, they show diminished or unchanged efforts.  In 
contrast, Figures 1-3 emphasize diversity among unions, and suggest that many unions, 
particularly larger unions, have coupled increased efforts with greater success.  How does one 
reconcile these seemingly inconsistent perspectives?  A:  “Blame the Teamsters” (and a few 
other large unions with organizing activity declines).  As Table 1 shows, the Teamsters “drove” 
about 1600 fewer elections in the Sweeney Era vs. the Kirkland Era.  Some other large unions 
also showed large decreases in organizing effort, and collectively these cases offset increases by 
many national unions.   
 
Preliminary Conclusions from the Descriptive Analysis  
 One can quibble about the adequacy of NLRB data and other indicators of union 
organizing activity, growth, and vitality.  Despite data limitations, however, it is hard to escape 
the view that aggregate U.S. union organizing activity and union vitality continue long term 
downtrends.  There are, however, encouraging exceptions to this gloomy generalization.  Many 
national unions have increased organizing efforts and success, no small accomplishment in the 
political economy of the early 21st Century.   
Despite growing recognition and rhetoric of organizing’s importance, modeling efforts 
designed to establish fuller understanding seem to have been largely abandoned.  This seems a 
“doubly grim vineyard” in addressing a somewhat necrotic topic with limited explanatory 
success.  Better data would help.  Trite as this may sound, it is important.  Consider that when 
Sweeney called for unions to boost organizing budgets, no one could offer a solid estimate of 
organizing expenditures, a baseline.  It is hard to assess progress when we don’t know the 
starting point.  Broader conceptualizations are also needed.  Amidst the focus on quantitative 
organizing goals and the confusion that has often accompanied “organizing model” rhetoric, 
means and ends have often been confounded.  Organizing is a means toward for improving 
worker well-being, not an end in itself.  Union density may be the single best indicator of union 
capacity to improve advance worker interests, but it has limitations (Sullivan 2007) and is not 
synonymous with vitality.   
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Broader conceptualizations are needed as well in terms of union environments.  It is said 
that a national union leader vowed to fire any organizer who organized a workplace in the 
union’s (declining) traditional jurisdiction.  Refocusing gone berserk, or a rational response to 
the futility of organizing workplaces almost certain to disappear in the face of daunting global 
competition?  Similarly, union decisions to organize or not have to be considered within specific 
worker and employer attitudinal climates.  We cannot gain a solid understanding when we 
simply compare Union A and Union B, or even Federation A and Federation C, without 
considering the differing environments they face. 
 Richer models of union organizing efforts are needed that consider both organizational 
and environmental factors.  Toward this end, a brief review of previous literature may be useful.  
 
Prior Research and Modeling Efforts 
 Union growth and decline and the processes by which workers join or form unions have 
been the focus of numerous studies.  A recent review (Godard 2007) provides a guide to much of 
the literature.  Here we briefly sketch some of the major lines of research. 
 Several studies have examined union growth and decline, typically in an aggregate time-
series framework (e.g., Stepina & Fiorito 1986).  These studies tend to focus on costs and 
benefits of union membership from an individual worker’s perspective to derive inferences about 
macroeconomic influences, including effects for unemployment rates, inflation, and wage 
changes.  A larger body of studies examined organizing success in representation elections 
(Heneman & Sandver 1983).  Typically using the representation election as the unit of analysis, 
these studies have linked union win rates and pro-union voting outcomes to election unit 
characteristics such as number of employees and employer opposition, environmental factors 
such as area unemployment rates, and other variables, including union characteristics in a few 
instances.  A still larger number of studies explore individual worker decisions to support or 
oppose unions in representation elections and more often in hypothetical elections (e.g., Blader 
2007).  Most often these studies emphasize attitudinal and perceptual variables such as job 
satisfaction and union instrumentality views, and their potential role as antecedents of voting-
related behavior or intentions.  Some relatively recent research has examined growth and 
organizing success on a union-by-union basis (e.g., Fiorito, Jarley, & Delaney 2002, Heery, et al. 
2003), or linked individual decisions or intentions, or election unit outcomes to union 
characteristics (e.g., Charlwood 2004).  More than others, these studies have emphasized union 
strategies and structures as antecedents in efforts to explain differences in outcomes. 
 All these lines of research have limited relevance for the question of union organizing 
effort.  Their main focus is on workers’ joining or voting decisions and the outcomes of union 
organizing.  Union organizing efforts are implicitly part of the “black box” by which individuals’ 
calculations, beliefs, and feelings translate into membership or election outcomes, but union 
decisions to offer representation services, or more properly in most cases, to seek the right to 
provide representation services, are obscured.  Any inferences from these studies about union 
organizing effort, or the supply of union representation services, are largely indirect.  Research 
on the supply side, or union organizing activity and effort per se is scant. 
 There have been some notable efforts to analyze or at least describe and qualitatively 
interpret aggregate union organizing activity (e.g., Chaison & Dhavale 1990; Farber & Western 
2002), or to explain differences across the U.S.-Canadian divide (e.g., Rose & Chaison 2001).  
These have highlighted the importance of the “supply side” for union growth and noted the 
comparatively low level, stagnation, and decline of union organizing efforts.  Others have taken 
the low level of organizing effort as a starting point, and focused on questions of why unions 
aren’t organizing more and whether and how organizational change within unions can boost 
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organizing (e.g., Bronfenbrenner 2001, Fiorito & Jarley 2003, Hurd 2007).   This latter body of 
research has noted that amidst the aggregate statistics showing low and stagnant or declining 
organizing efforts, there are large differences across similarly-sized unions in their organizing 
effort levels.  Thus key related questions addressed by these studies are why some unions seem 
far more committed to organizing than others, reasons for differences in organizing strategies, 
and how high commitment to organizing can be diffused to more unions.  Much of this work is 
descriptive and impressionistic, but it offers insights toward a more systematic understanding. 
 Also highly germane are previous efforts to model differential union organizing efforts.  
Studies by Block (1980) and Voos (1987) found support for some theoretical predictions.  Block 
(1980) found some support for hypothesized positive effects of employment growth and negative 
effects of membership concentration and density in unions’ primary jurisdictions on a relative 
organizing activity measure (elections per member across national unions).  There were murkier 
miscellaneous results, including some on union democracy and interactions.  Voos (1987) 
modeled organizing expenditures per primary jurisdiction employee by national union.  She 
found some evidence of a link to primary jurisdiction density in an inverted-U shape relation.  
 Block concluded that “Union success, union democracy, and union growth through 
organizing may therefore be incompatible” (p. 112).  Voos, however, concluded that “[T]he 
supply of union organizing services suffers not because union membership is too high, but 
because it is too low” (p. 29).  On related questions, Voos’ earlier (1983) evaluation of 
organizing showed that it had a favorable cost-benefit ratio, but nonetheless that organizing 
activity was declining.   
 Both Block and Voos were able to explain only small portions of observed variance in 
organizing activity across unions.  Voos’ (1987) R2 values ranged from .07 to .16, while Block’s 
ranged from .10 to .23.  It is possible that relative organizing efforts are subject to many random 
or idiosyncratic influences such as the ideologies or strategies of particular union leaders.  Even 
so, it is hard to interpret such results as highly successful modeling efforts.  Indeed, modeling 
efforts have been unsatisfying.  They offer “thin” conceptual models, low “explained” variance, 
some anomalous results, and are based on data from the 1960s-70s.   
 More recent and mainly qualitative assessments have been offered by several scholars.  
Bronfenbrenner (2001) stressed a harsh environment, political distractions, union education cuts, 
polling excesses, and union failure to undertake needed cultural change.  Farber and Western 
(2002) noted that “[E]xplanation is difficult to come by” (p. 398), but suggested that key factors 
might include a harsh political or economic environment and differential union-nonunion sector 
growth.  Heery et al. (2003) found that the use of organizing specialists (signaling commitment?) 
was linked to growth.  Hurd (2004) suggested that contributing influences included excess 
emphasis on the “organizing model,” dysfunctional and jealously-guarded national union 
autonomy, excess focus on numeric goals, and too little focus on “spirit and purpose.” 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 One of the Great Myths of organizing in both the UK and US is that millions of workers 
are ready to join unions and just need to be asked.  Polls do indeed show that millions say they 
would vote for a union in a hypothetical election, or possibly even join one, but again, in the 
abstract.  Even though unions enjoy their support to a degree, it is clear that for many workers, 
unions are still a long way from providing something that workers want to be part of badly 
enough to commit their votes in real campaigns, much less their dues and their continuing 
activism.  National and local unions are experimenting, as they should.  Both successes and 
failures can be instructive.  In the long haul, it will be unions that create an internal climate that 
fosters innovation and accepts occasional failures as a necessary consequence that are likely to 
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find the revitalization formula that works for their circumstances.  Scholars would do well to 
study these experiments and their results, not only in careful case studies and impressionist 
assessments, but also in broader attempts to model union processes and outcomes. 
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